

OURSELVES.

THE NEW SOUTH again presents itself as a newspaper to the people of this Department. Five months since the first number was issued, and the genuine favor with which it was received gave ample encouragement for continuing the enterprise. But scarcely had the second issue passed into the hands of its readers, when radical and important changes occurred in the military government. All the resources of the printing office—then less extensive than now—were needed by Gen. Hunter in the organization of the forces of his command. Of course private interests were cheerfully made secondary to the military emergency, and the publication of THE NEW SOUTH was temporarily suspended. Not many days afterwards, Mr. Badeau, the editor, was unexpectedly called to another field of usefulness; and the proprietor, having more urgent claims upon his attention, could not conveniently carry on the publication until the present time. Now, with an excellent new press and enlarged printing facilities, he resumes the enterprise, confident that its prosperous career will not be again interrupted. The platform of THE NEW SOUTH will not be changed a single plank from that announced in its "inaugural." The principles there set forth it will advocate persistently, conscientiously and to the best of its ability. We reprint these salutatory words,—only adding that cordial support and friendly countenance are asked of all who can endorse our position as thus defined:—

"Not often has a newspaper occupied so singular a position as that filled to-day by THE NEW SOUTH. Issued in a military command, addressed mostly to soldiers at the seat of war, its audience is yet not purely military, but in part naval, in part civil; it is possible that some portion may be found at the North, it is not impossible that we may occasionally reach the ear of Southerners, debarred now for more than a year from learning what the sentiments and intentions and power of the nation really are.

In acting as spokesman both to and for this varied population we shall have several aims in view; first of all to support, as far as we are able, the national government. In order to do this more effectually we shall abstain from the discussion of exciting political topics, believing that the business of our most immediate readers is now military, not political, and that it is the province of the true patriot at this juncture, to do nothing to divide the national forces, or to distract their energies from the one great object of us all, the suppression of the Rebellion. Here is a common ground where all can meet, and on that we mean to plant ourselves. It shall be our endeavor to strengthen the hands of the government and those who represent it, to incite the courage and fortify the endurance of its defenders, not to sow the seeds of discord among those who are themselves battling against the results of discord. Next we desire to furnish news of interest and importance to our readers: for the life and basis of a newspaper are its reliability in this regard. Information concerning public matters at the North, the movements of the national armies and affairs abroad, will be presented, in a condensed form, it is true, but still we trust a correct view of all important affairs will be afforded. The doings within this military command will of course receive a due share of attention. None of the posts occupied by our forces will be neglected, and proceedings of every nature fit for publication will be chronicled; but our loyal readers will not complain if we withhold any thing that could by any chance prove of service to the enemy. The news of the fleet, however, the daily life in camp, the health of the command, and a thousand other details will at once suggest themselves as proper subjects for report. These matters it is hoped, will prove of sufficient interest to the country at large for us to rely on a support from other quarters not altogether insignificant.

And if an occasional copy of a Union paper should find its way to the deluded and unfortunate people with whom we are contending, some idea of the hopelessness of their effort may be afforded them. When they discover that the Unionists are so firmly established here as to issue and support

newspapers, they will admit that we have no idea of returning; they will conclude that our occupation is not purely a military one; they will perhaps see how desperate is their own condition, and submit more readily to the government which has never wished to do more than bring them back to their allegiance, but which is determined to do that at every cost and at every hazard, and if need arises by the employment of every means.

The Department of Experiments.

Under present circumstances it may not be inappropriate to pass briefly in review the various events which have occurred in this Department, and to speak of them in their relations to the great struggle for national existence in which we are now engaged. It may with truth be said that few, if any, of the great results which sanguine journalists anticipated would follow the occupation of these sea islands, have been achieved; but, with equal truth it may be said, that, taking into view the original object of the expedition, and considering the resources at its disposal, more has been accomplished than could, by any right, have been expected.

The expedition under Gen. Sherman, was never designed to be the nucleus of an army of invasion. It simply was intended to co-operate with the naval forces under Admiral Dupont, in holding the islands surrounding Port Royal Harbor as secure places of anchorage and unmolested depots for the vessels of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron. At first it was contemplated that the military force should not exceed 8000 men and a few batteries of flying artillery,—sufficient to operate in the vicinity of Port Royal harbor. Subsequently additions were made to the original plan, looking to the occupation of Fernandina, St Augustine, Jacksonville, and other points along the coast, and a greatly increased force was assigned to Gen. Sherman's command; but the object of the expedition was never changed. The Government only desired safe havens and depots for its war vessels, and the collateral advantage of employing a large force of the enemy to observe and prevent irruptions from our different small posts along the coast line. So much in reply to the absurd complaints that this Department has not realized the just expectations of the country.

But we claim for the Department of the South an importance second to none for the influence it has had upon the public mind and upon the general conduct of the war. Eminently, it has been the great experimental department of the country, and upon its stage have been advanced ideas which, more than any others, have contributed to mould public opinion in reference to our national struggle and the wisest mode of conducting it.

The first experiment clearly developed the advantages of joint land and naval operations. The Navy took the Port Royal forts, opening the way for the army, and the latter repaid the favor by giving undisturbed security to the naval anchorage. But there were other and greater advantages growing out of the success of this experiment. The spirits of the people of the North which had been drooping for months under the weight of continued reverses to our cause, were now enlivened by the sound of the first pean of victory coming from South Carolina, assuring them that whatever might be the fate of our armies in the conflict, the supremacy of our sway over the waters of the South was placed beyond dispute. From this time dated a new era of activity in the Navy Department. Every dockyard felt the impetus imparted by Admiral Dupont's success, in the energetic preparations made by the nation to avail itself to the uttermost of the advantages offered by the naval supremacy.

The second experiment began in Gen. Sher-

man's inaugural proclamation, where an attempt was made to conciliate the stiff-necked Palmetto generation and win them back to their allegiance by reminiscences of the happy years they had lived under the protection of the flag which now they sought to displace. To these honeyed words the "chivalrous and hospitable people of the sovereign State of South Carolina," would scarcely deign to listen. It is certain that the experiment of conciliation proved a signal failure. We do not join in the clamor raised against Gen. Sherman for the inactivity which followed the non-success of his proclamation. On the contrary, considering the force at his command, he did all that could rightfully have been expected, and attempted even more than was legitimately within his reach. He broke his force into many fragments from a desire to occupy every possible point whereon he could get a foot, and no beneficial result of lasting good was consequent upon the disintegration.

A third and brilliantly successful experiment of this Department was the reduction of Fort Pulaski. It was there first demonstrated that rifled projectiles have an absolute domination over masonry fortifications; and from that bombardment must date a new era in the art of attacking and defending fortified places. It may not be generally known that the work of reducing Fort Pulaski from Tybee Island was undertaken by Gen. Gillmore in the face of dissuasion from the most eminent military authorities. The attempt to breach a pile of masonry from batteries of earthworks was regarded as impossible. But the shot which tore into ruin and pulverized into dust the walls of Pulaski, overthrew much more than brick, stone and mortar, and upset many theories of infinitely heavier calibre than any metal used in the works upon Cockspar Island. The lesson taught by Tottleben in the defence of Sebastopol, of the value of earthworks for resisting artillery, was not one iota more interesting to the military mind than the unmistakable proof, given by the batteries of Tybee Island, of the utter futility of solid masonry when assaulted by the new projectiles and heavier calibres of modern war. This experiment will bear fruit far into the future, and to the confidence which induced Gen. Hunter to place all the resources of his Department at Gen. Gilmore's disposition,—regardless of the generally accepted opinion of high military authorities,—the country, and especially the military professions, will hold themselves largely indebted.

But the most important experiment of the Department of the South, under Gen. Hunter's administration, has been of a purely moral significance. Himself not a politician, the force of his ideas, the candor with which he has avowed them, and his frank courage in facing all the responsibilities thereupon attendant, have done more (whether for good or evil,) to set the mind of the country seriously at work, considering the true issues of this war, than all the agencies of journalism, both Houses of Congress, and all the executive branches of our country combined. His action in declaring "Slavery and martial law incompatible" and of arming a regiment of blacks, has marked him a man of strong convictions and strong will to press his convictions to their fruition. His experiment in this regard we shall at present refrain from discussing,—looking upon its results as not sufficiently developed to give data for positive conclusions.

In conclusion;—to the Department of the South and the lessons which have emanated from its experiments, we claim that a high place will be given in the moral history of this struggle. It has not been a brilliant stage for the display of military capacity, or the acquirement of those laurels whose leaves are green forever;—but to the utmost extent of the powers with which it was endowed, and even to a greater extent than could have been justly hoped, it has been a Department of ideas—a great fountain of motive power, radiating its influences, far and wide, through the public mind.